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T he small town of Cornwall in eastern Ontario  can be considered the contraband capital of  Canada, thanks to the high volume of cross-
border smuggling and illicit trade in the area. The 
problem has two sources: the unique local geog-
raphy combined with practical, legal, and political 
problems that make it easy to bypass border con-
trols; and the tolerance of Canadian and US law en-
forcement toward the illicit manufacture and sale 
of tobacco products on the Mohawk territory that 
straddles the Canada-US border between Ontario, 
Quebec, and New York State. 
Much of the local problem revolves around tobacco; 
however, significant amounts of illegal drugs, weap-
ons, and humans have been trafficked through the 
area, all of these accounting for a chain of collateral 
crime in the surrounding region. The gross value of 
these illegal practices reaches into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars. 
Contraband has national security implications for 
Canada. Tobacco and its trade generate important 
economic benefits for the Mohawk community that 
lives on the Akwesasne (Canada) and St. Regis (US) 
Mohawk reserves that straddle the border. A sub-
stantial part of the production and sale is legal, but 
the Mohawk generally refuse to apply taxes to their 
legal tobacco products, and they tolerate the illegal 
production and sale of tobacco. As a result, a direct 
attack on those activities may provoke confronta- 
tions, and possibly even a loss of federal control over 
the border area. In addition, US authorities are pre-
occupied with the movement of illegal drugs and hu-
mans through Cornwall: any measures they take to 
stem the flow would hurt Canada economically by 
inhibiting the free circulation of goods and people 
across the border.
Illicit tobacco accounts for about 15 percent of cig-
arette sales in Canada, a large proportion of which 
comes through Cornwall. Attempts to constrict that 
flow have failed. However, the pressure exerted on 
the trade has helped keep profits much lower than 
they could have been. Given the sensitive political 
situation and the overlapping jurisdictions and le-
gal frameworks, enforcement authorities have been 
remarkably effective in containing broader security 
fallout. We found little evidence of extensive smug-
gling of drugs, weapons, and humans in recent years, 
and the large-scale involvement of organized crime 
appears to have been curtailed. Tensions with the 
Mohawk community have been rare, confrontations 
largely avoided, and a fluid and effective relationship 
with the Mohawk police on everything but tobacco 
on reserve has been built.
In summary, federal authorities on both sides of the 
border appear to tolerate the illicit tobacco trade in 
favour of containing the broader criminal and secu-
rity dangers that smuggling and its repression repre-
sent. On that count, current efforts have been quite 
successful. 
Executive Summary
The Seaway International Bridge over the St.Lawrence River connecting the city of Cornwall, Ontario in Canada to the town of Massena, 
New York in the US.
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L a petite ville de Cornwall, dans l’Est de l’Ontario,  peut être considérée comme la capitale de la con-  trebande au Canada, en raison de l’importance 
du volume du commerce et des échanges transfront-
aliers réalisés illégalement dans la région. Le problème 
a deux sources. D’abord, une géographie locale unique 
se conjugue à des problèmes pratiques, légaux et poli-
tiques de mise en œuvre des contrôles frontaliers 
pour faciliter le contournement de ceux-ci. Ensuite, 
les produits du tabac fabriqués et vendus de manière 
illicite sur le territoire mohawk qui jouxte la ville, et 
chevauche la frontière canado-américaine séparant 
les provinces de l’Ontario et du Québec de l’État de 
New York, bénéficient d’une tolérance des autorités 
dans l’application des lois prohibitives canadiennes et 
américaines. 
Le problème dans la localité est surtout attribuable 
au tabac, mais des quantités notables de drogues il-
licites, d’armes et de personnes font aussi l’objet d’un 
trafic, ce qui a entretenu dans les environs un réseau 
d’activités criminelles connexes. La valeur brute de 
telles pratiques illégales peut atteindre des centaines 
de millions de dollars.
La contrebande a des incidences sur le plan de la sé-
curité nationale du Canada. Le commerce de tabac 
entraîne d’importantes retombées économiques 
pour la communauté Mohawk des réserves mohawks 
d’Akwesasne (Canada) et de Saint-Régis (États-Unis), 
dont les territoires s’étendent des deux côtés de la 
frontière. Une part importante de la production et 
de la vente est légale, mais les Mohawks refusent gé-
néralement d’appliquer les taxes sur le commerce 
légal, alors qu’ils tolèrent la production et la ven-
te des produits du tabac faites dans l’illégalité. Par 
conséquent, les interventions directes visant à cir-
conscrire ces activités risquent de provoquer des af-
frontements qui pourraient aller jusqu’à entraîner 
la perte de contrôle fédéral sur la zone frontalière. 
En outre, les drogues illicites et les migrants clandes-
tins qui pourraient transiter par la région de Cornwall 
préoccupent les autorités américaines, et des mesures 
mise en place par les États-Unis en vue d’endiguer 
ces flux risqueraient de nuire au Canada sur le plan 
économique en entravant la libre circulation des biens 
et des personnes aux frontières.
Le tabac vendu illégalement, qui représente environ 
15 % du commerce de cigarettes au Canada, tran-
site en grande partie par Cornwall, et les tentatives 
d’endiguer ce flux ont échoué. Cependant, les béné-
fices liés à ce commerce sont bien inférieurs à ce qu’ils 
auraient pu être sans la vigilance qui a été exercée. De 
plus, les retombées de cette activité sur la sécurité en 
général ont été contenues grâce à la remarquable ef-
ficacité dont ont fait preuve les autorités policières, 
compte tenu d’un contexte politique très délicat et 
des chevauchements des compétences et des cadres 
juridiques. Ainsi, il y a eu peu d’indices de présence 
massive de contrebande de drogues et d’armes ou 
d’une circulation importante de migrants clandestins 
au cours des dernières années. En outre, l’implication 
d’organisations criminelles majeures semble avoir été 
contenue. Les tensions avec la communauté Mohawk 
ont  été rares, et les affrontements en grande partie 
évités. Une coopération efficace s’est développée avec 
les services policiers mohawks et une coopération ef-
ficace semble prévaloir, sauf en ce qui a trait au tabac à 
l’intérieur des réserves.
En résumé, les autorités fédérales des deux côtés de la 
frontière semblent tolérer le commerce illicite de tabac 
afin de concentrer plutôt leurs efforts sur la lutte con-
tre les activités criminelles et les menaces à la sécurité 
plus graves que la contrebande de tabac. De ce point 
de vue, les efforts actuels apparaîssent fructueux. 
Sommaire
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Introduction
A s the saying goes, Canada and the United  States (US) are separated by the longest unde-  fended border in the world. The two coun-
tries have developed a level of interdependence 
unique among major economies. Keeping that bor-
der secure and open stands as a crucial security pre-
occupation for the two countries, especially Canada, 
which is smaller and more dependent on access to 
its neighbour’s market. The problem is particularly 
acute for Ontario, whose industrial fabric is woven 
into the manufacturing heartland of the US. 
For the last 20 years, contraband tobacco has rep-
resented one of the most significant challenges to 
border integrity. The problem centres in the Corn-
wall area around the Akwesasne-St. Regis Mohawk 
Reserve, which straddles the frontier at the juncture 
of New York State, Ontario, and Quebec. Despite 
its small size, the area has become the most impor-
tant channel for smuggling tobacco products into 
Canada. 
Geography and a jurisdictional vacuum at the fron-
tier are the main contributor to the creation of a 
contraband haven in the Cornwall area. The St. Law-
rence Seaway is the dividing line between Canada 
and the US and between the Aboriginal lands of the 
Mohawk Council of the Akwesasne (Canada) and 
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (US). The Mohawk Na-
tion of Akwesasne also controls a number of small 
islands within the river and lands south of the river 
in Quebec, which lie adjacent to the US border and 
the St. Regis Mohawk territory. 
The Seaway International Bridge runs from Corn-
wall, Ontario, to Massena, New York, crossing over 
Cornwall Island and the St. Lawrence Seaway, thus 
spanning the territory of the Mohawk Nation of 
Akwesasne. Although the Canada-US border geo-
graphically divides this region, residents of the Mo-
hawk nation travel freely across this territory with-
out interference by customs authorities. The official 
border crossing at Cornwall-Massena is only one of 
many possible access points in this sparsely populat-
ed, largely rural region. The river often freezes over 
during the winter, resulting in numerous unofficial 
“ice roads” between the US and Canada. Covert trav-
ellers can traverse undetected through remote areas 
with a combination of all-terrain vehicles, snowmo-
biles, and speedboats, or they can simply cross at 
one of the unmanned crossings east of Cornwall 
(ONDCP 2012, 30).
The smuggling infrastructure established to sustain 
the tobacco trade has been used for other “goods” 
and the amount of money involved have developed 
into a major law enforcement and security conun-
drum. Weapons, drugs, and people, sometimes 
in large quantities, have been illegally trafficked 
through the reserve, and the profits generated by 
the various smuggling activities constitute a large 
amount of money whose use escapes all control. 
With illicit tobacco at its core, the whole problem 
can be understood as a series of concentric circles 
with increasingly broad security implications.
The illicit trade in tobacco is a criminal activity in it-
self. It also breeds criminality: directly, in protecting 
illegal production, commerce, and money launder-
ing; and indirectly, by encouraging criminal organi-
zations to be active in other illegal ventures. In ad-
dition, the criminal architecture built around illicit 
tobacco, particularly the trafficking routes and net-
works, has been used to transport other “products”, 
from drugs and weapons to humans. The profits can 
be used to seed other criminal activities or finance 
terrorist organizations. Since much of the illicit 
trade takes place around and across the border be-
tween Canada and the US, it also potentially threat-
A secure, open border is a security 
priority for Canada and the US.
The smuggling routes established 
for tobacco are also used for drugs, 
weapons, and humans.
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ens Canada’s relations with the US by raising US in-
securities about its northern border. US measures 
taken to stem contraband could impair the free flow 
of merchandise and people between the two coun-
tries, creating a direct cost to Canada’s economy. 
A significant part of the illicit trade involves tobacco 
itself and tobacco products grown, manufactured, 
stored, and sold on Aboriginal reserves, or smug-
gled across the Canada-US border through the Ak-
wesasne/St. Regis Mohawk reserve, which straddles 
the border. Tobacco products are legally manufac-
tured in these communities, but the legitimacy of 
any prohibition or taxation of both licit or illicit to-
bacco is also strongly challenged within the com-
munity. This situation, combined with the threats 
to and sanctions against the production and trade 
considered illicit by non-Aboriginal governments, 
creates a significant potential for confrontation be-
tween law enforcement agencies and the commu-
nities. Over the last 25 years, such confrontations 
have led to the blockade of roads, rail lines, bridges, 
border entry points, and, in extreme cases, to the 
de facto suspension of the federal presence on the 
communities’ territories. Such occurrences repre-
sent significant security threats in themselves. 
These challenges are magnified by overlapping juris-
dictions, a thicket of treaties, legislations, and regu-
lations, competing and sometimes conflicting policy 
priorities, and a throng of agencies (such as law en-
forcement, Indian affairs departments, health, and 
revenue) brought in as a consequence of the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem.
This paper examines the nature and scale of the 
challenges posed by contraband in the Cornwall 
area and the efforts being made to tackle it. The first 
section provides a general background to the study 
by situating illicit tobacco in the broader context of 
Canada’s tobacco economy. Section two proposes 
a general framework to assess the security implica-
tions of contraband, which section three then ap-
plies to Canada. Section four examines current ef-
forts at fighting the trade, as well as a series of policy 
options.
 1  Background: 
Illicit Trade and the 
Tobacco Economy in 
Canada
I n 2011, Canada’s approximately five million  smokers consumed between 25 and 31 billion  cigarettes (the equivalent of 125 to 150 million 
cartons of cigarettes).1 In the same year, the mar-
ket value of legal cigarettes distributed wholesale 
(150 million cartons) was around $10 billion (NSRA, 
2012).2 Taxes represent roughly three quarters of 
the retail value of a pack of legal cigarettes for a po-
tential tax revenue of $7.5 billion, of which provin-
cial governments capture 60 percent. Breaking this 
down further, $3.3 billion goes to the federal gov-
ernment, $1.6 billion to Ontario, $860 million to Al-
berta, $790 million to Quebec, and $700 million to 
British Columbia.3
Assessing the volume of the illegal tobacco econo-
my is more challenging. Estimates of the share of 
illicit tobacco hover between 15 and 33 percent of 
Canada’s market, reaching 40 percent in Quebec 
and 50 percent of Ontario. Recent surveys, however, 
converge toward the lower end of those estimates. 
In a study done for Philip Morris International, the 
GfK Group found a market share of 27.2 percent in 
Ontario and 14.9 percent in Quebec (Philip Mor-
ris International 2012, slide 48). The Non-Smokers’ 
Rights Association (NSRA), using estimates from 
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada (PSFC) and data 
from Health Canada, suggests that about 12 percent 
of the whole Canadian market was made up of illicit 
tobacco in 2010 – down from 20 percent in 2009 
Legal tobacco sales generated $7.5 
billion in tax revenue in 2011.
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and 25 percent in both 2008 and 2009 (NSRA 2012, 
7). For the purpose of this study, we will assume a 
national share of 15 percent, which is compatible 
with the GfK Group results (given that the problem 
of illicit tobacco is generally considered to be worst 
in Quebec and Ontario) and with the recent PSFC 
numbers.
Using the aforementioned tobacco use data, be-
tween 19 and 23 million cartons of illicit cigarettes 
are consumed every year in Canada, with a market 
value – at the national average price of $83 – of $1.5 
to $2 billion. In turn, potential tax losses are be-
tween $900 million and $1.2 billion, concentrated 
in Quebec and Ontario. However, these numbers 
grossly inflate both the value of illicit tobacco and 
the losses to governments. The main reason is that 
illicit tobacco is sold at a massive discount: bags of 
200 cigarettes are sold for as low as $6 on reserves 
(Luck et al. 2009, 489) to between $14 and $20 out-
side (RCMP 2011a; Stinson 2010). Given that much 
of the trade takes place on reserves, we will use $15 
as the average price per illicit carton, yielding a mar-
ket for illicit tobacco worth between $285 and $345 
million dollars in 2010. At such low prices, consump-
tion of illegal products is probably much higher than 
it would be for legal products and consequently tax 
losses are probably also significantly lower than the 
numbers quoted above suggest.
More important to our purpose, however, is the 
net value of illicit tobacco. To go from gross to net 
value, one must deduct production and distribution 
costs. In 2002, it cost about $1.02, net of taxes, to 
produce a pack of cigarettes (Health Canada 2003), 
including everything from labour and capital to the 
purchase of raw tobacco. These costs have changed 
since 2000, with the price of significant components, 
such as raw tobacco, rising rapidly in Canada.4 Still, 
even using 2002 cost numbers, production alone 
would consume a substantial portion of gross rev-
enue, leaving between $97 and $135 million before 
distribution. Retail costs – likely to be high because 
of the inefficiency of a large number of small sellers 
either on- or off-reserve – are still to be subtracted 
from this. The leftover, which reflects wholesale and 
distribution, is impossible to determine precisely, 
but a reasonable estimate is $75 million dollars an-
nually. This represents “pure” illicit revenue, or the 
gross profit to criminal organizations.5
As figure 1 (on page 10) makes clear, smuggling illic-
it cigarettes into or out of Canada is much less lucra-
tive and much more risky than smuggling legal ciga-
rettes across jurisdictions in the US. Because they 
sell at a much higher price, the profit generated by 
the sale in New York City of legal cigarettes bought 
in low-tax jurisdictions like Virginia is larger than the 
price of native-manufactured cigarettes in Montreal 
or Toronto. While some of the numbers used by the 
US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives (ATF) strain belief (such as its estimate of $85 
profit per carton for a sale in New York of Virginia 
cigarettes), there is much leeway before reaching 
the $6-$20 sales price of native cigarettes.
Before moving to a systematic discussion of the func-
tioning and consequences of the illicit economy, 
one should note the very skewed relation between 
the illegal gains of trafficking and the losses imposed 
on the legal industry and on governments. Assum-
ing that illicit products account for a 15 percent 
share of the market and that half of consumption 
stopped as prices rose after the elimination of con-
traband, then the gross revenue of the legal sector 
would increase at most by $423 million and govern-
ment tax revenues by $572 million. So overall, about 
one billion dollars is lost to the legal economy, with 
about a third (gross) going to the whole illicit sector. 
The rest, about 70 percent, is pocketed by smokers 
themselves. Indeed, and strictly from an economic 
perspective, smokers benefit the most from cur-
Illicit tobacco is sold for as little as  
3 cents per cigarette on reserve  
and 7 cents off reserve.
The net revenue of the illicit  
tobacco trade is $75 million  
annually.
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rent arrangements, and would consequently suf-
fer the most, through higher prices and reduced 
consumption, from the elimination of contraband. 
 
 
 
 
 2  The Workings of 
the Illicit Tobacco 
Trade
T his section proposes a simple framework that  breaks down the various components of the  illicit tobacco economy and applies it to the 
Canadian case. It specifies the conditions that make 
illicit tobacco profitable, and thereby pinpoints 
where policy can intervene most effectively.
2.1  The political economy of 
illicit tobacco
The black market in tobacco is made possible by dif-
ferences in applied government taxes (Gabler and 
Katz 2010). Figure 1 gives a vivid picture of the in-
centive these price differentials create between juris-
dictions in the US and in Canada. The map located 
in appendix 1 makes clear that taxes drive the poten-
tial for illicit trade. 
The kind of price gap that exists between North Da-
kota and Manitoba (about $5 a pack) is enough to 
stimulate significant cross-border smuggling. The 
same holds for the gaps between prices in New York 
State and those that prevail in Pennsylvania or Vir-
ginia – with an interstate highway linking them and 
no border controls. 
The price differential introduced by tax rates, how-
ever, is only part of the equation. Production and 
transportation costs matter too. But above all are 
the costs from the illicit nature of the activity, which 
can be broken down into three broad categories: the 
“clandestine premium”; the cost of sanctions, both 
formal and informal; and the opportunity costs from 
involvement in criminal activities. 
Clandestine activities have major drawbacks, despite 
avoiding taxes. Obviously, they cannot rely on cus-
tomary state protection, leaving vigilante self-help, 
with all the risks and costs entailed, as the only re-
course. Operators must acquire more passive pro-
tection than normal citizens, but also have their own 
“police” and finance their training and equipment 
(which involves further illicit activity). Nor can op-
erators rely on judicial institutions to resolve the 
large amount of conflict. The rules, generally un-
written, are not always clear, and it is difficult to get 
reliable information on price, quality, quantities, or 
the identity of potential partners. Access to finan-
cial and banking services are constrained, creating 
a need to launder money, which also has a cost and 
involves more illicit actions. Finally, operators can-
not fully rely on the institutional infrastructure of 
society, such as the transportation network or the 
use of professional services. 
Not content with leaving clandestine activities de-
fenceless, state authorities actively sanction them. 
The cost that state and societal sanctions represent 
depends on their severity and on the probability 
that they will be imposed. These problems are com-
pounded by the opportunity costs that individuals 
choose to forego by being involved in illicit activities 
instead of earning a legal living. 
In other words, the profit created by differential tax-
es is only part of the story. This simplified model can 
be summarized in the following table:
About $1 billion is lost to the legal 
economy due to illegal tobacco.
The black market in tobacco is  
made possible by differences in 
applied taxes.
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MAP SOURCES
http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/le/les/121120_map_and_table_reviewed.pdf
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf
http://www.smokefree.gov/SmokersData.aspx
http://www..smokefree.gov/map.aspx
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMap-USA-states-Canada-provinces,_HI_closer.svg
FIGURE 1 Prices of individual cigarette packages in North America, 2012
2012 CIGARETTE PRICE
PER PACK (USD)
$3.97 - $5.00
$5.00 - $6.00
$6.00 - $7.00
$7.00 - $8.00
$8.00 - $9.00
$9.00 - $10.00
$10.00 - $11.16
 MAP PREPARED BY BRENDAN O’NEILL
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Smuggling is a function of
P – (AP&T + I + O)
where
P  is the black market profit created by 
interdiction or taxation,
AP&T  is the cost of acquiring, producing, 
and/or trading the smuggled product,
I  is the cost of illegality itself, which is 
made up of
  the clandestinity premium (CP): 
legal products can be handled more 
cheaply than illegal ones (for example, 
transporting large quantities in the 
most efficient way possible), and they 
are not subjected to the extra activities 
that must be done when engaging in 
illegal trade; 
  government sanctions (GS): the impact 
of which must be weighted by their 
severity and the probability that they 
will be imposed; and
  social sanctions (SS): the reputational 
costs linked to engaging in illegal 
activities, weighted by their severity 
and the probability that they will be 
imposed, and
O   is the opportunity cost of engaging 
in smuggling: the benefits from other 
activities that are set aside as a result of 
devoting time, resources, and effort to 
smuggling.
2.2 Illicit tobacco in Canada
Today, illicit tobacco in Canada has four main com-
ponents: (1) counterfeit cigarettes imported from 
overseas; (2) illegal cigarettes manufactured in Can-
ada and the US on Aboriginal reserves and sold in 
Canada; (3) cigarettes produced legally in Canada, 
the US, or abroad, and sold tax-free to non-Aborig-
inals; and (4) “fine cut” tobacco imported illegally, 
mostly by Canadian-based manufacturers (CBSA 
2010, 4; RCMP 2011, 8).
In the 1990s, most tobacco contraband involved cig-
arettes legally produced in Canada by major manu-
facturers. Brands that had no significant market in 
the US were exported to that country and imported 
back by smugglers, mostly through Aboriginal re-
serves, to be sold illegally and tax-free in Canada. In 
2008 and 2010, following police investigations and 
legal proceedings, Imperial Tobacco Group, Roth-
mans, Benson & Hedges Inc., JTI-MacDonald Corp., 
and the Canadian subsidiary of RJR Reynolds To-
bacco Company agreed to pay a total of $1.7 billion 
dollars in criminal fines and civil restitutions (RCMP 
2011, 8) for their role in the smuggling scheme. 
The original “model” for illicit tobacco was replaced 
in part by the trade of cigarettes manufactured on 
Aboriginal reserves. An important part of that pro-
duction takes place in Canada and is perfectly legal. 
For example, Grand River Enterprise (GRE), which 
is based on the Six Nations of the Grand River re-
serve in the heart of Ontario’s tobacco country, “is 
now the third or fourth largest tobacco company in 
Canada, producing about as many cigarettes as JTI-
Macdonald, which has 13 percent of the Canadian 
tobacco market”, although much of its production is 
exported to the US (NSRA 2012, 03). In addition, a 
number of smaller First Nations manufacturers op-
erate under licence on other reserves.6 It is a grave 
mistake to conflate the growing Aboriginal tobacco 
industry with contraband. However, iIlegal produc-
tion does take place on Canadian and US reserves, 
and US products and US-sourced fine cut tobacco is 
smuggled illegally into Canada. Most of this tobacco 
crosses the border between formal ports of entry by 
land through unmanned crossing points or by boat 
(snowmobiles in winter) across the St. Lawrence 
River. Fine cut tobacco from the Carolinas (Brennan 
2009) is smuggled through the same routes by illicit 
manufacturers in Canada, who rely increasingly on 
diverted and stolen tobacco from Ontario farmers 
(Blackwell 2010). In addition, legal cigarettes from 
Aboriginal or major manufacturers meant to be sold 
tax-free to Aboriginals are instead sold illegally to 
non-Aboriginals (RCMP 2011).
It is a grave mistake to conflate  
the growing Aboriginal tobacco  
industry with contraband.
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Finally, the sale to non-Aboriginals of cigarettes le-
gally allowed to be sold on reserve, but only to Indi-
ans, has grown into an important component of the 
illicit trade. A recent study done for the Canadian 
Taxpayers Federation (Fildebrandt 2012, 18) sug-
gests that 2.3 million cartons – representing 10-12 
percent of total illicit sales – are distributed in this 
way.
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), illegal manufacturing on Mohawk reserves 
on both sides of the border continues to be the main 
source of illicit tobacco products (RCMP 2011).7 
However, data on seizures from the Canadian Bor-
der Service Agency (CBSA) suggests that imports of 
counterfeit and legal cigarettes from China, mostly 
through Port Metro Vancouver, are quickly gain-
ing ground (CBSA 2010). The 197,445 cartons that 
the CBSA seized in marine containers during 2010 
(CBSA 2010, 4) equal 55 percent of the number of 
cartons confiscated that year by the Cornwall Re-
gional Task Force, which includes seizures made by 
the CBSA, the RCMP, and other police forces outside 
the CBSA controlled ports of entry (CBSA 2010, 5). 
Illicit tobacco also enters Canada through mail and 
courier services (CBSA 2010, 5), either within smug-
gling networks or by direct Internet sales.8 As well, 
part of the market is occupied by tobacco and ciga-
rettes stolen from farms or legitimate businesses.
The central role of Aboriginal reserves in the illicit 
market stems from the differential tax treatment of 
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals. Gabler and Katz 
write
(S)tatus Indians remain exempt from 
federal and provincial sales taxes when 
purchasing goods and services on re-
serves, including sales taxes on tobacco. 
However, merchants on a reserve are 
obligated to collect sales taxes when 
selling goods and services to Aboriginals 
without Indian Status and non-Aborig-
inals. Status Indians are also exempt 
from provincial excise taxes, but are 
required to pay federal excise taxes, in-
cluding taxes on tobacco products, both 
on and off a reserve. In reality, however, 
Canadian law enforcement is effectively 
powerless to enforce tax obligations on 
Aboriginal territory because of Aborigi-
nal territorial autonomy and charter 
rights. (2010, 36).
Arguably, the law could be enforced as smuggled cig-
arettes leave the reserves (Dickson-Gilmore 2002). 
It is to some extent, but enforcement is severely 
constrained by legal and political factors. Section 8 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
regulates the ability of law enforcement authorities 
to search and seize, imposing very high standards 
for reasonable and probable grounds. Even at bor-
ders where standards are somewhat relaxed, impor-
tant restrictions remain.9 Searches done immedi-
ately surrounding the limits of Aboriginal reserves 
are submitted to higher standards of privacy, which 
require strong grounds. Applying standards used at 
border control zones for these areas has huge impli-
cations, as they would entail some legal recognition 
of the international character of reserve boundaries. 
This is not a discussion that governments appear 
willing to enter and as a result, most seizures result 
from old-fashioned investigations and inspections 
restricted by the law. As our survey of illicit tobacco 
consumption makes clear, the results are meagre. At 
its height in 2009, only one out of every 27 packs of 
illicit cigarettes bought in Canada was seized by law 
enforcement authorities. 
Much of the discussion concerning the basic equa-
tion above is notional, as estimating the precise 
In 2009, only 1 in 27 packs of illicit 
cigarettes bought in Canada was 
seized by law enforcement.
Illegal manufacturing on reserves  
is the main source of illicit  
tobacco products.
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costs and revenue from illegal activities is extremely 
difficult. It is nonetheless possible to identify a num-
ber of key variables in each component that affects 
illicit tobacco and its trade.
R: GROSS PROFIT FROM ILLICIT TOBACCO
As discussed in section 1, the gross overall black 
market profit generated by illicit tobacco is substan-
tial ($285 to $345 million). In principle, it could be 
much larger. Some researchers have stated that il-
licit tobacco is “a near perfect substitute” for legal 
products10 (Gabler and Katz 2010, 38), since surveys 
show “smokers fail to perceive a difference in quality 
between lawful and contraband cigarettes, and...do 
not acknowledge any harm associated with the black 
market.” Luk et al. confirm that consumers treat ille-
gal tobacco as legal (2009, 489). This attitude is very 
surprising given the price at which illicit tobacco is 
offered. A discount of $1 to $2 a pack should be suf-
ficient to buy a perfect substitute for what one nor-
mally consumes and treats as legal. In this scenario, 
the illicit gross profit would be multiplied by four or 
five, to $1.2 billion to $2 billion.
The answer to this puzzle lies in two factors. Con-
trary to the studies quoted above, consumers appear 
to consider illicit tobacco less desirable than legal 
tobacco products. First, whether because of inferi-
or quality, poorer taste, brand loyalty (TIFP 2009, 
5) or the illegality itself, they are unwilling to pay 
as much for contraband tobacco as they are for the 
legal product. Law enforcement is a second, more 
influential factor. By complicating distribution out-
side reserves, police enforcement creates an exceed-
ingly competitive sales environment on the reserves, 
the only locations where tobacco products can be 
bought openly. This gives consumers tremendous 
leverage over the numerous “smoke shack” own-
ers and further depresses prices.11 In other words, 
the largest impact of law enforcement on tobacco 
smuggling lies less in seizing illicit products than in 
depressing the market price and, consequently, the 
gross profit (R in the equation above). While much 
smaller than it could be, the profit from illicit to-
bacco remains substantial.12
AP&T: THE COST OF ACQUIRING, PRODUCING, 
AND/OR TRADING THE SMUGGLED PRODUCT 
These costs vary according to the product and its ori-
gin. For the substantial volume of legal or counterfeit 
cigarettes imported through Port Metro Vancouver, 
transportation costs to the market in southern On-
tario and Quebec are substantial. For cigarettes pro-
duced on reserves, a central issue would be import-
ing fine cut tobacco, mostly from North and South 
Carolina. On-reserve manufacturers and smugglers 
also have to contend with inefficient bulk transpor-
tation – the speedboats, snowmobiles, private cars, 
and trucks with which much of the smuggling takes 
place (Brennan 2009) are not designed to transport 
large volumes. Smuggling a few large containers 
through Toronto’s Pearson Airport, Windsor’s Am-
bassador Bridge, or Port Metro Vancouver would be 
much more efficient. 
Manufacturers of illegal tobacco products also have 
to find and buy filters, papers, machinery, and parts.
I: THE COST OF ILLEGALITY
The costs of illegality can be broken into three parts: 
the costs linked to the clandestine character of the 
trade, government sanctions, and social sanctions.
A number of costs derive from the simple fact that il-
licit tobacco is exactly that. Manufacturers and smug-
glers have to invest significant amounts of money to 
protect their trade. Production facilities need to be 
acquired, staffed, and run without legal guarantees, 
insurance, or the possibility of resorting to courts 
and public safety institutions. These facilities must 
be protected with weapons and qualified personnel. 
Losses from damage to production or storage facili-
ties, or from the destruction of, theft of, or damage 
to products from the smuggling process have to be 
covered. Government policy affects these costs. The 
licensing of tobacco farmers and government pro-
grams to wean farmers away from the crop force 
manufacturers to rely on illegal acquisition from dis-
tant US tobacco farmers. Law enforcement pressures 
and credible threats against convenience stores and 
other retailers push the illegal trade onto the streets 
A number of costs derive from the 
simple fact that illicit tobacco is 
exactly that.
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and force on-reserve sellers to compete against one 
another.
Law enforcement also involves sanctions that im-
pose some direct costs on illicit activity. These in-
clude the seizure of tobacco and tobacco products 
and the confiscation of vehicles as well as fines and 
arrests. The impact of sanctions depends on their 
severity, their swiftness, and their certainty. As we 
will see in section four, the government has just 
proposed changes to the Criminal Code that would 
severely stiffen the sanctions imposed on tobacco 
smugglers. Until now, however, those have typically 
been light, with large fines rare and often ignored. 
Only a very small proportion of illicit tobacco is 
seized, and most smuggling is never sanctioned. In 
other words, direct sanctions have not imposed a 
very high cost to the trade.
Things could be different from a social standpoint. 
Indeed, people who engage in illicit activities typi-
cally have little respect for social norms. In the case 
of illicit tobacco on reserves, reputational costs ap-
pear to be minimal, especially in the Mohawk ter-
ritories where much of the trade is concentrated. 
Official statements, media sources, and the scholarly 
literature suggest that few people oppose smuggling 
and that the occasional disagreement stems less 
from illicit tobacco itself than from the other crimi-
nal activities that surround it. Indeed, a very broad 
agreement seems to exist among Mohawks about 
the legitimacy of tobacco trade across the Canada-
US border within Mohawk territory. There is simi-
larly little support for collecting federal and provin-
cial taxes on the reserves (RCMP 2008; Sweeting, 
Johnson, and Schwartz 2009; Dickson-Gilmore and 
Whitehead 2003; Gabler and Katz 2010, 37). In the 
greater Cornwall region, the economic benefits of il-
licit tobacco are widely recognized (Brennan 2009), 
again despite the side effects of crime and insecurity. 
O: OPPORTUNITY COST
While the Cornwall region’s unemployment rate is 
slightly lower than Ontario’s average, it has suffered 
from the collapse of key industries since the 1980s. 
This makes smuggling an attractive source of in-
come (Blackwell 2012). While detailed statistics are 
hard to find, the situation in Akwesasne is unlikely 
to be better. In such a context, cigarette production 
and smuggling is appealing, even if only to top up 
weekly or monthly earnings. For young people and 
the unemployed, smuggling three or four cases of 
cigarettes out of the reserve in a small passenger car 
represents more net profit in a matter of hours than 
could be earned in a week working at minimum 
wage.13 
To summarize, the overall gross profit generated by 
illicit tobacco smuggling is $300 to $400 million. Our 
estimate of the net profit, at around $75-80 million, 
is much smaller. Effective police enforcement and 
an extremely competitive retail market prevent rev-
enues and profits from being much higher. Illegal-
ity increases production costs (especially in obtain-
ing the actual tobacco), and it generates significant 
inefficiencies as well as protection costs. Sanctions 
through direct law enforcement and social pressure 
have little or no impact. Opportunity costs are rela-
tively low in southern Ontario and Quebec reserves, 
given economic conditions in production and smug-
gling areas.
 3  The Security 
Implications of Illicit 
Tobacco
I n this section, we explore the consequences  of illicit tobacco for the broader security of Ca-  nadians. We look primarily at its linkages with 
crime and the potential for significant threats to na-
tional security. These include terrorism, loss of ter-
ritorial control, and the adverse impact of changes 
Smuggling three or four cases of 
cigarettes out of a reserve nets  
more profit than a week working  
for minimum wage.
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in US foreign policy towards Canada. The analysis 
focuses on the Akwesasne-Cornwall area, although 
a significant and growing portion of tobacco smug-
gling passes through Port Metro Vancouver, where 
CBSA tobacco seizures were about half as large in 
2010 as in the Cornwall area (CBSA 2010).
The impact of cigarette smuggling on security can be 
seen as a series of concentric circles whose core is 
illicit tobacco (see figure 2).
FIGURE 2 Illicit tobacco’s ripple effect on 
security
Surrounding the core are illegal activities linked to 
supplying the factories, protecting the facilities and 
the trade, and laundering profits from it (“collateral 
crime”). A third circle involves the use of smuggling 
routes and networks for the illegal trade of other 
commodities, in this case drugs, weapons, and hu-
mans. The fourth circle includes activities that can 
be financed with the proceeds from illicit trade, of 
which two broad types are relevant: other crimi-
nal activities and terrorism. A fifth circle concerns 
the potential loss of control over territory caused 
by the consolidation of illicit networks or conflicts 
between the territory’s population and law enforce-
ment agencies over the repression of illegal activi-
ties. The reaction of neighbouring states to the inse-
curity generated by smuggling and its repression is 
also part of the equation.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the peculiari-
ties of each circle with regard to illicit tobacco in 
Canada, and assess the threat that each represents 
based on the following sources: a comprehensive 
analysis of CBSA seizures at Akwesasne/Cornwall 
since 2008 (obtained through an Access to Informa-
tion request), the review of all Canadian judicial cas-
es referring to Cornwall or Akwesasne since 1990,14 
the reports about illicit tobacco, transborder crime, 
drugs, weapons, or human smuggling produced by 
the RCMP, CBSA, Canada’s Department of Public 
Safety, and by US government agencies and US think 
tanks. We also draw on the scholarly literature about 
illicit tobacco in North America, on media reports 
from Canadian and US sources, and on informal 
discussions with consumers and buyers of illicit to-
bacco and drugs in Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba. 
Additionally, our assessment is based on the testi-
monies of current and former Canadian law enforce-
ment officers who are or were directly involved with 
the enforcement of illicit tobacco and illegal drugs.15
3.1 Illicit tobacco
Illicit tobacco has developed into a major business 
in southern Ontario and western Quebec, particu-
larly in the Cornwall area, because of the unusual 
confluence of geographical, legal, jurisdictional, in-
stitutional, and social factors. Article II of the 1794 
Jay Treaty, signed by the British Crown and the US, 
states that “[n]o Duty of Entry shall ever be levied 
by either Party on Peltries brought by Land, or In-
land Navigation into the said Territories respec-
tively, nor shall the Indians passing or re-passing 
with their own proper Goods and Effects of what-
ever nature, pay for the same any Import or Duty 
whatever” (our emphasis). Mohawk representatives 
have argued publicly and in court that this clause 
implies a right to trade goods across the border 
without paying any duty or tax. Canada never ad-
opted legislation to implement the treaty, however, 
and Canadian courts refuse to accept it as a basis 
for Indian claims, a stand that Mohawks have never 
accepted.16 Moreover, given that tobacco has been 
grown and smoked from time immemorial in east-
ern North America, Mohawks believe its trade to be 
legal under even the most restrictive reading of the 
Neighbours' reaction
Loss of territorial control
"Collateral" crime
Illicit 
production 
and 
smuggling
Financing of other 
criminal activities
Drugs, weapons, 
migrants smuggling 
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Jay Treaty. The outcome is an uncomfortable mo-
dus vivendi where the application of Canadian and 
US law to tobacco is broadly seen as illegitimate. As a 
result, the scope of effective law enforcement has to 
be constantly negotiated. For all practical purposes, 
police ignore cigarette production and trade on Mo-
hawk territories, and focus their enforcement efforts 
on capturing tobacco products as they exit by land 
or water.
Closely related to this issue, the tax status of Aborigi-
nals is a key component of the problem (see above). 
In theory, the price for non-Aboriginals would be 
the same on- or off-reserve. The vast majority of Ab-
original retailers, however, refuse to collect taxes 
from any customer, Aboriginal or not, because it 
gives them a competitive advantage, at the expense 
of off-reserve merchants. Nevertheless, there are a 
variety of other reasons for this refusal, some po-
litical or concerning sovereignty claims, but others 
very pragmatic and bound to the fiduciary duty of 
the federal government towards Aboriginals (Gra-
ham and Bruhn 2008), an issue to which we return 
when examining policy options. 
The geographical boundaries of the Mohawk terri-
tories of Quebec and Ontario are not unique. Sev-
eral reserves in the US and Canada lie on or close to 
the border between prairie provinces and northern 
midwestern states, or along the shore of the Great 
Lakes that separate the two countries. What makes 
them unique is that they both lie close to or – in 
the cases of Akwesasne – right over the border and 
they are very close to huge markets in Canada. Some 
eight million Canadians (from the Greater Toronto 
Area to Montreal in the east) live within two hours of 
a Mohawk reserve, half of them within 60 minutes. 
Several other converging factors have made Akwe-
sasne in particular a node of illicit tobacco smug-
gling in North America. First, the territory falls 
within the jurisdiction of two national governments 
(Canada and the US), two provincial governments 
(Ontario and Quebec), one state government (New 
York), and two Aboriginal governments (for the US 
and Canadian sides of Akwesasne). Leaving aside the 
thicket of administrative agencies (discussed in the 
next section), this creates huge opportunities for fo-
rum shopping and the exploitation of legal, regula-
tory, administrative, or political discrepancies, con-
tradictions, tensions, and conflict. As well, through 
tense and sometimes violent political mobilization, 
the Mohawk have claimed a degree of sovereignty 
over the territory that non-Aboriginal governments 
have de facto acknowledged in a multitude of nego-
tiations, consultation and cooperation for, joint ini-
tiatives, or simple everyday interactions. In practical 
terms, a space has been created in which practices 
that are clearly illegal beyond the reserve are toler-
ated on it. This is precisely the space occupied by 
the illicit manufacture and sale of tobacco products. 
An oft-mentioned advantage of the Akwesasne/Corn-
wall area from a smuggler standpoint is its location 
on both sides of the St. Lawrence River and on sev-
eral small islands, including St. Regis and Cornwall 
Island. Given the location of the toll in the middle of 
Cornwall Island, it was long possible for vehicles to 
circumvent it and cross the border with little or no 
control. In 2009, the simple and strikingly belated 
relocation of the toll to Cornwall on the north bank 
of the river complicated smuggling by forcing smug-
glers to rely increasingly on speedboats or, in the 
winter, snowmobiles or small trucks over the frozen 
river. 
This last point introduces an important element. 
Using our previous estimates of illicit sales (4.2 bil-
lion cigarettes/year) and of the content of a typical 
case of cigarettes (50-60 cartons), a large proportion 
of the roughly 350,000 cases this total represents 
needs to be transported over the border. With an 
average truck carrying 800 cases (Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 2011), hun-
dreds of trucks and thousands of ordinary vehicles 
are engaged in smuggling. This is where Cornwall’s 
comparative advantage as an entry point for high 
volumes of low-value contraband diminishes (see 
figure 3). 
For all practical purposes, police 
ignore cigarette production and  
trade on Mohawk territories.
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FIGURE 3 Top ten truck entry points into Ontario 
since 2000
Source: Statistics Canada. 2010. Table 427-0002 - Number of 
vehicles travelling between Canada and the United States, annual.
What the Akwesasne/Cornwall area does have, how-
ever, is a complex riverine border area that extends 
some 40 kilometres almost all the way to Valleyfield, 
Quebec. An individual can cross the border and 
the river while staying within the reserve – or can 
cross the river by boat, car, or truck while staying 
both within the reserve and within Canada, there-
by avoiding border control. In addition, long prac-
tice (for legitimate and illicit business) has made a 
number of local people experts at manoeuvring the 
channels and islands that dot the river to the east. 
The Ontario river bank is densely built with houses 
and quays that offer hundreds of possible docking 
places. With the road option essentially blocked 
when the toll was moved, the waterway has become 
the main option for smugglers. It is far from ideal, 
however. County Road 2, which follows the river 
bank, is heavily patrolled day and night, which may 
explain why smuggling has been pushed further 
east. Reduced seizures in Cornwall and increases in 
western Quebec attest to this.17 
Cornwall/Akwesasne does not have a strong advan-
tage for high-volume trade, but (as discussed in the 
next section) it is an appealing channel for low vol-
umes of high-value trade because of the lack of effec-
tive law enforcement or supervision over significant 
areas of rural territory that can be easily crossed with 
speed boats and all-terrain vehicles.
Smoking has been declining steadily in Canada.
Nevertheless, other factors are at play. Smoking has 
been declining steadily in Canada in the general 
population and among young people. Rates in On-
tario and Quebec, where illicit tobacco is concen-
trated, have closely followed national trends (see 
figure 4 below). Even though the presence of illicit 
tobacco affects average prices and availability, effec-
tive health policy has offset much of its influence on 
smoking rates.
FIGURE 4 Smoking prevalence in Canadians 
over age 15, 1981-2011
Source: Health Canada, 2012.
While not central to our discussion and extensively 
covered elsewhere, the health implications of illicit 
tobacco warrant a note here. Smoking has impor-
tant health consequences and significant financial 
implications for smokers and the healthcare system. 
Research consistently shows that price is a critical 
determinant of smoking levels. The lower price of 
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illicit tobacco clearly increases consumption, espe-
cially among low-income smokers. Smoking makes 
them sick, shortens their lives, and facilitates initia-
tion for minors. A broad approach to security would 
consider the very existence of illicit tobacco a secu-
rity threat (Joosens et al. 2009; Luk et al. 2008).18
3.2 Collateral crime
The illicit manufacture and trade of tobacco products 
is a business. It involves suppliers, running produc-
tion, and storage facilities (including their protec-
tion, the recruitment of workers, the establishment 
of distribution networks, the need to access credit 
and to “bank” and protect revenues and profits and 
to invest the latter). These activities make up a large 
constellation of illicit activities and involve a signifi-
cant number of people.
From a narrow security perspective, the most signifi-
cant threats from collateral crime derive from pro-
tecting facilities and activities, and from enforcing 
the large number of informal contracts that underlie 
the business. Most of these activities take place in 
Akwesasne.
A number of studies and media reports indicate that 
intimidation is common around production and 
storage facilities, and that violence has been used ex-
tensively to secure control of shares of the traffic and 
to protect them (Blackwell 2010; Marsden 2009; Ga-
bler and Katz 2010, 10). However, a comprehensive 
review of court cases in Quebec and Ontario since 
2000 reveals very few instances of violence and no 
reports of theft or violence around distribution net-
works. An effective protection racket thus appears to 
be in place. The de facto tolerance of illicit tobacco 
on reserve by the police seems to ensure that the 
racket is not disrupted, and probably contributes 
to reducing violence off reserve. In addition (see 
below), the legitimacy of the trade within the com-
munity and the fact that violence is not condoned 
(Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead 2003) encourage 
smugglers to tread as softly as possible and avoid 
police interventions, which would likely be seen by 
the community as legitimate. 
3.3 Mixed smuggling: drugs, 
weapons, and humans
A smuggling infrastructure is made up of a network 
of people who are knowledgeable about the border, 
trafficking routes, and law enforcement infrastruc-
ture and practices and who have reasonably good 
relations with the local population and, when pos-
sible, with law enforcement authorities. Setting up 
and maintaining such an infrastructure is costly and 
takes time. In the case of Akwesasne/Cornwall, ex-
isting smuggling networks have significant “sunk” 
investments in their infrastructure, which provides 
a huge advantage over newcomers. Indeed, given 
the relatively small size and cohesion of the com-
munity, setting up new networks would prove dif-
ficult, risky, and costly. Those who control existing 
networks are likely then to use them to smuggle 
other goods, and outsiders likely to link up with 
them to exploit the infrastructure further. The rela-
tive disadvantage of Cornwall from the standpoint of 
large-volume smuggling disappears in favour of high 
value but small volume trade. 
Overwhelming evidence exists that the mix of drugs, 
weapons, and people illegally crossing the border 
in the Akwesasne/Cornwall area differs for flows 
into and out of Canada. Weapons, cocaine, and, to 
a much lesser degree, heroin enter Canada, while il-
legal migrants, ecstasy, and high potency marijuana 
are smuggled into the US. However, reports from 
Canadian law enforcement (CBSA and RCMP) sug-
gest that, tobacco aside, the region is not a major en-
try point for illegal goods coming into Canada. The 
reverse appears not to be true. Media reports and 
The lower price of illicit tobacco 
increases consumption.
Cornwall’s smuggling infrastructure 
attracts high value but small  
volume trade.
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statements by US public officials suggest that this re-
gion of the international border is a major conduit 
for illegal drugs and human trafficking into the US.
DRUGS
The CBSA’s Quarterly Drug Assessments Reports 
for the period between November 2009 and Feb-
ruary 2011 do not include a large number of drug 
seizures. The largest one, in August 2010, involved 
$3500 worth of ecstasy pills (about 175) – a minute 
amount given consumption levels in Canada. There 
are several reports of mostly very small seizures of 
marijuana. We only found one instance of heroin 
trafficking in our review of court cases, dating back 
to the 1990s and involving one kilogram of pure 
heroin. 
The story in the other direction is very different. 
According to US government sources, illegal drugs 
worth $1 billion are exported illegally through Akwe-
sasne/Cornwall. US border authorities have seized 
significant quantities of marijuana, and they allege 
that much more gets through (Schumer 2009). Ac-
cording to one media report, “tons of high-potency 
marijuana” are smuggled through Akwesasne, “rep-
resenting 20 percent of the overall Canadian pro-
duction” (Kemp 2011).19 
One Canadian court case in the last 14 years explicit-
ly links the area to marijuana smuggling into the US. 
The case involved individuals associated with the 
Italian mafia exporting 225 pounds of marijuana per 
month in 2005. Given the very high proof require-
ments, full prosecutions necessarily underestimate 
the scale of the problem, but the rarity of cases still 
suggest that large-scale trafficking is unusual in the 
area (R. v. Di Rienzo, [2006] J.Q. no 14089). More-
over, recent legislative initiatives in the US, where 
laws restricting marijuana use are being relaxed, are 
likely to reduce the appeal of Canadian imports. In 
addition, these numbers need to be put in context: 
according to the White House Office of the Nation-
al Drug Control Policy, “relative to Mexico and the 
US, the Canadian supply is small” (UNDCP 2012, 94 
n.85).20
With marijuana losing ground, amphetamines – 
both MDMA (ecstasy) and methamphetamines – ap-
pear to increasingly dominate the trade in drugs, 
with Canada becoming a major producer and ex-
porter to the US (NDIC 2011, 31; UNDCP 2012, 
Chap. 4). Some reports suggest that Akwesasne/
Cornwall plays a significant role in the trade; how-
ever the RCMP believes that most production takes 
place on the West Coast (Kemp 2011) and is unlike-
ly to be exported through Ontario. The US Depart-
ment of Justice (NDIC 2011, 9) agrees and considers 
West Coast Canadian Asian gangs the main culprit 
in the trade. Moreover, larger points of entries are 
likely to be preferred because the chemical precur-
sors necessary to produce the drugs are shipped in 
bulk. Indeed, aside from the confiscation of 50,000 
tablets from a Cornwall couple 21 at the Massena 
point of entry (across from Cornwall), seizures of 
ecstasy mentioned in the CBSA Drug Assessment Re-
ports outside BC took place at the Champlain, Peace 
Bridge, or Blue Water Bridge US points of entry. 
In both cases, transborder trade appears to be losing 
its charm. Again according to a US Department of 
Justice report, both high-potency marijuana (NDIC 
2011, 29) and MDMA production are moving to the 
US. In the case of MDMA, the main motives are “to 
lower transportation costs, and to avoid the risk of 
seizure at the US-Canada border” (NDIC 2011, 9).
WEAPONS
Illicit weapons are regularly seized at the Cornwall 
border. Media reports describe sizable seizures of 
high-powered automatic weapons. A spokesperson 
for the RCMP told the Toronto Star that “it is not un-
usual [for Mounties and Akwesasne Aboriginal po-
lice] to find hundreds and hundreds of guns. There 
are AK-47s, grenade launchers and so forth” (Bren-
nan 2009). Our review of court cases and of CBSA 
seizure reports finds such occurrences unusual and 
we were in fact unable to trace any massive weapons 
seizure to the area. Moreover, the RCMP considers 
the main channel through which illegal weapons are 
introduced into Ontario the Interstate 75 corridor 
from Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Michigan, which 
crosses the border either at Detroit-Sarnia or at Sault 
Ste. Marie. For Quebec, the main sources of illegal 
Amphetamines dominate the  
illegal drug trade.
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weapons were Vermont, New Hampshire, and Mary-
land, which suggests a route east of Cornwall (RCMP 
2007).
Overall, weapons do not appear to be a major item 
of smuggling in Akwesasne. However, the very na-
ture of the illicit tobacco trade calls for those who 
engage in it to use violence or its threat to protect 
their business and enforce contracts. The limited 
number of illegal weapons seized may thus only re-
flect the care with which they are brought over the 
border. 
PEOPLE
At the end of the 1990s, an organization responsible 
for smuggling 3600 Chinese nationals in 1998 and 
1999 was dismantled by a joint operation of the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, various US 
federal agencies, the St. Regis Mohawk Police, the 
RCMP, and other Canadian law enforcement agen-
cies. The illegal immigrants were smuggled from 
Canada to the US through the Akwesasne/St. Regis 
Mohawk reserve. The smuggling ring is estimated 
to have grossed $170 million over these two years 
(GAO 2000; Barnes 1999). Since then, the trafficking 
of illegal migrants has been a staple of media reports 
on illicit activities in the Akwesasne/Cornwall area. 
Except for one report about a Pakistan-based net-
work trying to bring immigrants into Canada, cases 
regarding illegal entry are of individuals or small 
groups of migrants from a wide range of countries 
(China, Korea, Poland, and recently Nigeria) pass-
ing through the territory and into the US (Moore 
2001; Spencer 2011; Barrera and Jackson 2012). Ac-
cording to the most recent US Department of State’s 
annual report on human trafficking, the Cornwall/
Akwesasne area does not represent a major point of 
entry for illegal immigrants into the US (US Depart-
ment of State 2012).
Overall, the case of illegal immigrants appears typi-
cal of the broader picture of “mixed smuggling”. 
Much more than cigarettes has been crossing the 
border illegally over the years but the volumes have 
been relatively small (except for the major human 
smuggling operation dismantled at the end of the 
1990s), and appear to have declined since 2008. 
While tobacco, cigarettes, and some weapons flow 
into Canada, drugs and migrants flow south. More-
over, CBSA seizures between 2006 and 2010 suggest 
that cigarette shipments are typically not mixed with 
other illegal commodities. Unlike the trade in illicit 
tobacco, trafficking in drugs and people involves 
criminal organizations and networks from outside 
the reserve, often from immigrant communities, al-
though the extent to which these outsiders collabo-
rate with local smugglers is unclear. 
3.4 Support for other criminal 
activities
Law enforcement and media reports have estab-
lished a broad range of links between organized 
crime and the large amount of money generated 
by illicit tobacco. A number of channels have been 
mentioned. Non-Aboriginal criminal organizations 
have directly joined the trade and revenues finance 
unrelated criminal ventures, such as weapons and 
drug-trafficking (RCMP 2011, 11). 
The RCMP has pointed out that a large proportion 
of the country’s known criminal organizations are 
directly involved in illicit tobacco. These estimates 
vary from 25 out of a total of 105 groups (Brennan 
2009), to “as many as 100 organized crime groups” 
out of an unmentioned total, operating in Akwe-
sasne (Brennan 2010). Such numbers (for a com-
munity numbering about 10,800 on the Canadian 
side)22 would imply a stunning density of criminal 
organizations. Much of this appears to be an artefact 
of the way in which “organized crime” is defined. 
In keeping with international practice, Canadian law 
enforcement considers that an organized criminal 
organization can have as few as three members.23 
Canadian law enforcement agencies have long ar-
gued that important criminal organizations, such as 
the Hells Angels and Asian mafias, have linked up 
with Aboriginal tobacco smugglers (CISC 2004) and 
become involved in the distribution of illicit tobac-
co or used the territory to smuggle tobacco across 
the border. This is consistent with the RCMP’s view 
Cigarette shipments are not  
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that “most of the organized crime groups across the 
country involved in the illicit tobacco market are also 
active in other forms of criminality” (RCMP 2011, 9).
Canadian analysts have also quoted European pub-
lic officials to the effect that the proceeds from il-
licit tobacco finance other criminal activities (Myers 
2012, 9-10). At face value, this is surprising, as it sug-
gests that some illegal practices, highly valued but 
not very profitable, have to be subsidized by others. 
In practice, profits from smuggling would logically 
be used to protect the trade and keep it running. 
Above all, other criminal activities open up avenues 
to spend illegal profits, only parts of which may be 
laundered at a good price in the legal economy.24 
The availability of business opportunities where few 
questions are asked about the origin of the money 
invested is clearly appealing. 
Very little evidence is available to support these 
claims. Of the many cases we found in the Quicklaw 
database that mention the Hells Angels (497) or any 
mafia (500), only five refer to the Akwesasne-Corn-
wall area. While one (R. v. Di Rienzo, [2006] J.Q. no 
14089) deals with a significant cannabis trade con-
trolled by the Italian mafia, none of those five makes 
a connection with illicit tobacco.
3.5 Financing terrorism?
While profits from legal activities, such as the con-
struction business in Saudi Arabia, can be used to 
finance terrorism, illicit profits are more appealing 
since they are much more difficult to trace. Illicit 
tobacco and the criminal activities that surround it 
could support terrorism. Gabler and Katz (2010, 8-9) 
report that the RCMP and the ATF are concerned 
that “tobacco smuggling is being used to fund ter-
rorism.” More concretely, since 2001, court cases in 
Europe and the US have identified illicit tobacco as 
a source of funding for the Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party) and one of Saddam Hussein’s sons, 
and for Hezbollah in Michigan and North Carolina 
(Shelley and Melzer 2008). The cases involved to-
bacco giants RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris Inter-
national, which used illicit channels controlled in 
part by terrorist organizations to circumvent the em-
bargo against Iraq and market their products in that 
country. There also was a Hezbollah cell in Char-
lotte, North Carolina, which exploited price differ-
entials between that state and Michigan to generate 
revenue for the organization. 
The scope for this type of “diversion” of illicit tobac-
co revenue is extremely broad; however, the illicit 
economy is immense – the cocaine market in North 
America and Europe is worth $70 billion – yet the 
financial needs of terrorist organizations relatively 
limited. The overall cost to al-Qaeda for the 9-11 at-
tacks was estimated at $1 million (Kleiman 2004). 
While tobacco smuggling certainly contributes to 
the pool of money that terrorist organizations could 
use, it is difficult to argue it represents a security 
threat because it facilitates terrorism.
3.6 Sovereignty and territorial 
control
From a government’s standpoint, effective territorial 
control is one of the most basic conditions of na-
tional security and public safety. The issue becomes 
even more critical for border areas. Full access to 
Mohawk territories and freedom of movement for 
government officials and law enforcement officers 
needs to be secured. Control over who enters and 
exits these territories is an important security issue, 
particularly in Akwesasne. 
For historical reasons, the kind of control over space 
and people that the government claims in the Mo-
hawk territories is weaker than in the rest of Canada 
and, in practice, it is the object of constant implicit 
and explicit negotiations. Freedom of circulation be-
tween the US and Canadian sides of Akwesasne im-
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plies an inherent limit on Canada’s ability to control 
the movement of people. Similarly, the very fact that 
illicit production of cigarettes and especially illicit 
sales to non-Aboriginals are tolerated implies that 
law enforcement authorities recognize that they are 
not to enforce all the laws of the country in that par-
ticular space. The systematic use of joint operations 
involving the Akwesasne Mohawk Police is another 
admission that the freedom of action of Canadian 
law enforcement is reduced in that space.
In general, however, government access to the terri-
tory is largely free, and Canadian laws are enforced. 
This has not always been the case. Following the 
Oka crisis, which involved an armed confrontation 
and stand-off between Mohawk warriors and Cana-
dian law enforcement (Pertusati 1997), access to the 
Kanesatake Mohawk reserve was denied for years, 
creating a pocket of territory near Montreal in which 
Canadian government authority simply did not ap-
ply. Kanesatake is not on the border, however, and 
nothing of the sort has happened in Akwesasne. The 
lessons from that crisis are relevant as it brewed 
from a simmering conflict that was poorly managed 
and led to an escalation and a major challenge to 
the government’s effective sovereignty. The implica-
tions for the management of illicit tobacco are clear: 
better to compromise on full control than potential-
ly lose all of it. 
The other side of this issue is even more directly re-
lated to the management of illicit tobacco. As dis-
cussed in the next section, joint Canada-US law en-
forcement is a logical way to deal with a problem 
largely stemming from overlapping transborder 
challenges. However, many Canadians perceive joint 
enforcement with the US as a breach of the country’s 
sovereignty and, as such, as a security threat. This 
rationale is behind resistance within Canada against 
extending the current cross-border policing activi-
ties on waterways to land patrols (Meyer 2013). 
3.7 An indirect threat through 
its impact on the US and the 
reaction this may provoke
Canada’s security has long been intimately related to 
that of its southern neighbour. Intertwined interests 
have led to the closest bilateral security relationship 
currently in existence. Intertwined, however, does 
not mean identical. A threat to the US can present a 
security challenge for Canada in two very different 
ways. One derives from the two countries’ common 
interests; for example, the terrorist attacks on the US 
as the embodiment of “the West.” The other derives 
from Washington’s reaction to threats that may not 
target Canada or to problems within Canada that 
may have security implications for the US. This is the 
case with the existence of terrorist cells in Canada, 
with drug production and violence in Latin America 
(Daudelin 2013), or with illicit production and smug-
gling of tobacco, drugs, and immigrants through a 
northern border deemed insufficiently secure. 
The free flow of goods across the border remains 
crucial for Canada’s economy. That dependence is 
reciprocal but extremely asymmetric, with Canada 
having much more at stake than the US. The result is 
that a major security aspect of Canada’s fight against 
tobacco smuggling involves demonstrating that it is 
making enough effort to limit the threat to the US. 
Public statements and government reports showing 
Canada to be a major source of drugs for the US are 
a threat to the bilateral relationship.
Overall, and in spite of the substantial value of the 
trade, the security threats that illicit tobacco repre-
sents appear to be moderate due to a number of 
factors. The most important is the huge discrep-
ancy between the risks and costs involved in smug-
gling cigarettes and tobacco compared with drugs, 
weapons, or illegal migrants. With profits substantial 
enough, smugglers have few incentives to graduate 
to more lucrative but riskier ventures. As we discuss 
farther down, changes to the Criminal Code could 
affect these calculations.
The illegal nature of the trade and the need to laun-
der and spend its proceeds put pressure on those 
involved to get become more involved or to engage 
in other illegal activities. In addition, groups for 
The free flow of goods across  
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whom sanctions are likely to be higher than those 
of the Mohawk have a very different incentive struc-
ture, and can use illicit tobacco to support more 
ambitious and dangerous criminal and political en-
deavours. Although this has not yet happened on a 
significant scale, connections with criminal organi-
zations and well established operational procedures 
would make it relatively easy to diversify away from 
tobacco if circumstances warranted. 
 4  Current Policies 
and Options
P olicies regarding illicit tobacco pursue three  broad objectives: recapture lost tax revenue,  reduce smoking rates, and reduce crime. 
Wiping out smuggling would serve all three. A part 
of current consumption would turn to taxed tobac-
co products; some consumption would vanish as a 
result of the price increase, and illicit trade and col-
lateral crime would be curtailed. These objectives 
are embedded in broader security preoccupations 
that centre on maintaining a good relationship with 
the Mohawk communities, maintaining access and a 
degree of control over the border area, and avoiding 
confrontation that could lead to an Oka-like disas-
ter. It is not clear that the outright elimination of 
illicit tobacco would serve these broader objectives. 
Conversely, the pursuit of these latter goals signifi-
cantly constrains the fight against illicit tobacco.
This section briefly reviews the peculiarities of the 
environment in which policies regarding illicit to-
bacco are developed and implemented. It then ex-
amines the main components of current policies, 
and assesses plausible ways to amend them. 
4.1 A complex policy 
environment
The problem of illicit tobacco in central Canada, 
particularly in the Akwesasne/Cornwall area, lies at 
the confluence of four of this country’s most thorny 
and important policy challenges: tobacco consump-
tion and control, which is a major public health con-
cern and engages massive amounts of resources; 
the social and economic situation of First Nations, 
which carves islands of extreme poverty out of one 
of the world’s richest countries, and their unsettled 
relationship with federal/provincial governments; 
Canada’s relations with the US, by far this country’s 
most important foreign policy file for economic, po-
litical, and strategic reasons; and the management 
and containment of crime and violence, which pre-
occupy a quickly aging population.
Each problem involves different constellations of 
players, whose preoccupations, priorities, and inter-
ests are typically distinct but also conflict or over-
lap in surprising ways. For example, the tobacco 
industry, the anti-tobacco lobby, and government 
treasuries – especially provincial ones – converge 
to eliminate tobacco smuggling. Law enforcement 
organizations and the First Nations authorities of 
the territories involved in tobacco manufacturing 
or smuggling agree on the need to avoid violence 
and broader criminality from developing around the 
tobacco trade and its repression. The national secu-
rity establishments in Canada and the US appear less 
worried about illicit tobacco than about transborder 
smuggling or the possible loss of control over terri-
tories that straddle the border or lie very close to it. 
Policy intervention in such a context acts like a cue 
ball on a pool table and yet, the scatter of current poli-
cies constitutes a surprisingly effective compromise. 
This is particularly remarkable when one considers 
the complexity of the jurisdictional, regulatory, and 
administrative environment, vividly illustrated by 
the diagrams in appendices 2 and 3, about the ad-
ministrative and policy frameworks relevant to illicit 
tobacco, particularly around Akwesasne-Cornwall. 
The rest of this section examines the main principles 
of the current policy framework, organized around 
their objectives and functions, and the options that 
are on the table.
Eliminating smuggling would 
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4.2 Reduced tobacco 
consumption
A black market is still a market and, as such, it de-
pends on the existence of demand. Without smok-
ers, there is no market for tobacco, legal or not. Giv-
en a slate of measures that maintain the proportion 
of illicit tobacco to about 15-20 percent of total de-
mand, reduced consumption would directly affect 
profits from illicit activities and collateral crime. The 
fact, noted above, that tobacco consumption has de-
clined in Ontario and Quebec in step with the rest of 
the country, shows that public education outweighs 
the lower average price for illicit tobacco in those 
two provinces. Any gain on the smoking front has a 
positive impact on the security equation.
4.3 Taxation
Without high taxation, there would be little profit in 
illicit tobacco. Lowering taxes, a measure that the le-
gal industry supports, would drastically reduce prof-
its from smuggling and make much of the endeavour 
uneconomical (Blackwell 2012). The ripple effect 
on collateral crime would be weakened or, if taxes 
were low enough, eliminated. Obviously, those who 
have sunk resources into establishing smuggling 
networks would diversify and other products would 
likely be brought in to uphold the basic smuggling 
pipeline. The huge difference, however, is that the 
smuggling of people, drugs, and guns has no local 
legitimacy, making enforcement much easier. 
Lower taxes would very significantly reduce govern-
ment revenues, to the point of losses being larger 
than those caused by smuggling. In addition, smok-
ing rates would undoubtedly rise. Although difficult 
to calculate precisely, most studies converge on a 
relative increase of about 4 percent for each de-
crease of 10 percent in the purchase price. In other 
words, a large reduction in taxes could wipe out a 
substantial part of the progress made in recent years 
on smoking cessation.
A compromise would be to maintain high taxes, but 
share them with reserves where illicit tobacco is 
produced or smuggled, or mandate reserve authori-
ties to collect taxes from non-Aboriginals (Luk et al. 
2009, 494; Graham and Bruhn 2009), which they 
would now have an incentive to do. In this scenario, 
governments still lose some tax revenue, but smok-
ing rates would not be affected. 
The proposal is seductive but replete with difficul-
ties. For one thing, First Nations have until now 
adamantly refused to collect taxes. Collecting taxes 
for the federal or provincial government implies the 
negation of sovereignty claims over the territory in 
favour of a subsidiary position relative to external 
political authorities. There is also a fear that if tax-
es were collected and kept in the community, the 
federal government’s fiduciary duty towards those 
First Nations (which would now have some self-sus-
taining income) would be weakened, and the secu-
rity that derives from this duty would be threatened 
(Graham and Bruhn 2008). Finally, this option is 
unlikely to affect illicit trade, as those who would 
benefit from the new tax revenues are unlikely to be 
those who benefit most from smuggling. Changes in 
taxation policy appear to hold few promises.
4.3 Stronger enforcement of 
prohibition
Compared to drugs or minerals, cigarettes and to-
bacco products have a relatively low value per unit 
of volume. Their production and storage on a sig-
nificant scale requires space, posing enormous 
challenges. This is why most activity takes place in 
countries such as China and the Balkans, where 
it is tolerated by some local, regional, or national 
governments. In Canada and the US, where govern-
ments do not turn a blind eye, prohibition should 
be a simple affair. 
As stated above, however, there are spaces in south-
ern Ontario and western Quebec where it is ex-
tremely difficult to police the illicit tobacco trade. 
Law enforcement authorities have focused instead 
on controlling the flow of traffic into and out of 
these territories, with some limited success.
Smuggling people, drugs, and guns 
has no local legitimacy, making 
enforcement much easier.
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Contraband is intercepted at the border post in 
Cornwall, through which most cars and trucks leav-
ing Akwesasne on the Canadian side have to pass. 
Until 2009, the location of the border post in the 
middle of Cornwall Island allowed vehicles leaving 
the reserve with tobacco products to bypass inspec-
tion. As a result of moving the toll to the Canadian 
river bank, smugglers must now cross the St. Law-
rence River to avoid it. However, this border post 
may be relocated to the US side. From the smug-
glers’ perspective, this would be ideal as they could 
cross by boat from the US side, always staying within 
the Akwesasne/St. Regis reserve territory, and then 
move the goods via the road without any inspection. 
Other than at the CBSA border posts, the RCMP 
leads Canadian enforcement efforts. The RCMP de-
tachment in Cornwall is the second largest in On-
tario, with 46 officers and 6 civilians.25 A number of 
new initiatives involve the coordination and joint 
action of all the law enforcement agencies in the re-
gion. The Cornwall Regional Task Force, established 
in 2010, includes the RCMP, the CBSA, the Ontario 
Provincial Police (OPP), and the Akwesasne Mo-
hawk Police. A specialized unit devoted to tobacco 
smuggling has also been set up: the Cornwall Com-
bined Forces Special Enforcement Unit-Contraband 
Tobacco Initiative (CFSEU-CTI) includes RCMP of-
ficers, OPP, Cornwall Police, CBSA, and Akwesasne 
Mohawk Police. 26 In addition, the RCMP and OPP 
have embedded officers in the Akwesasne Mohawk 
Police. 
Coordination with US law enforcement agencies has 
also increased, although this is meant to strengthen 
border integrity as a whole, not just contraband in-
terdiction. A binational Border Enforcement Secu-
rity Task Force (BEST) has been established in the 
Cornwall/Massena area. The RCMP leads Canadian 
participation, with various task forces or regional 
police services (for example, Peel Regional Police 
Service, RCMP Toronto Immigration Task Force, 
Cornwall and Greater Toronto Area (GTA) CBSA 
Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Divisions) 
brought in as needed.27 
The most recent initiatives are based on the Inte-
grated Cross Border Law Enforcement Operations 
Act that allows US officers to cross the border into 
Canada where they have “the same power to enforce 
an act (sic) of Parliament.”28 The best known initia-
tive launched under the Act is the Shiprider program, 
which involves joint patrols by US and Canadian bor-
der enforcement units. Joint land patrols are being 
planned, although the idea is generating significant 
discomfort and opposition in Canada. Shiprider is 
not operational in the Akwesasne-Cornwall area ei-
ther, at least in part because non-Aboriginal govern-
ments’ full jurisdiction over the waterways is con-
tested by Mohawk authorities.
US collaboration is obviously crucial, though pro-
hibition appears to be just as constrained there by 
limited de facto access to the US side of reserves, 
where a large cigarette manufacturing capacity ex-
ists (partly because it is much easier there to obtain 
legal tobacco, which does not have to cross a border 
to reach production facilities). If up to 90 percent 
of illicit tobacco indeed originates from those facto-
ries, US efforts would have the largest impact on the 
trade.29 Such numbers are highly disputable, how-
ever, as production in Canada (particularly in Kahn-
awake and on the Six Nations of the Grand River 
reserve) has increased substantially in recent years.
In practice, most efforts involve arresting smug-
glers and seizing shipments as they leave the reserve 
through border posts or the Canadian side of the St. 
Lawrence River. Fines are imposed for possessing il-
licit tobacco, but media reports suggest few are ever 
fully paid or that payments are staggered over such 
long periods that the fines become irrelevant. Most 
people caught at the border post, in Cornwall or on 
Highway 401 between Montreal and Toronto are 
Contraband is intercepted at the 
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teenagers or young men – almost invariably “small 
time smoke runners” (Stinson 2010). The manufac-
turers and criminal networks that control large-scale 
distribution beyond the reserve are rarely caught 
or sanctioned unless they engage in other kinds of 
smuggling. 
The impact of these efforts should not be dis-
missed. Relocating the toll to Cornwall and inten-
sifying patrols along the river bank had numerous 
effects (Brennan 2010). Seizures were displaced 
from Cornwall eastward towards Valleyfield, Que-
bec. Shipments have been confiscated regularly or 
destroyed when smuggling boats throw cases over-
board before speeding away. Together with what 
fines are paid, the resulting pressure appears to be 
significant enough to change the pattern of smug-
gling. The adaptation required imposes additional 
costs and reduces the net profit, with a domino ef-
fect on collateral crime. 
Overall, the results remain disappointing for a very 
simple reason: the manufacturing and storage facili-
ties (where larger loads are bought in bulk) and the 
stores and “shacks” (where tobacco products are 
sold to non-Aboriginals) are on-reserve and are es-
sentially immune to police action. Outlets operate 
in plain sight behind the legitimacy conferred on 
them by the fact that the community on both sides 
of the border cares little about this illegal trade.
If Shiprider is not extended to the area, pressures 
on the smugglers are unlikely to increase, unless im-
portant investments are made to patrol the whole 
Canadian river bank by land – a policy that will be 
constrained by legal restrictions to search-and-seize 
beyond border areas; that is, along most of the two 
banks of the St. Lawrence River east of Cornwall. 
Whether or not such resources are invested, it is dif-
ficult to see how the highly controversial joint land 
patrols would change the enforcement landscape 
given that the problem lies over the water or strictly 
on the Canadian side. 
In March 2013, the Canadian government an-
nounced measures which will significantly tighten 
the current regime for illicit tobacco. The most im-
portant one consists of proposed amendments to 
the Criminal Code that introduce more severe sen-
tences for those who “shall sell, offer for sale, trans-
port, deliver, distribute or have in their possession 
for the purpose of sale a tobacco product, or raw 
leaf tobacco that is not packed, unless it is stamped” 
(Senate of Canada 2013). Prison terms of up to five 
years are specified for 10,000 cigarettes (50 cartons 
or a single case) or 10 kg of tobacco or other tobacco 
products. Compulsory minimum sentences are in-
troduced for repeat infractions, with prison terms of 
90 days, 180 days, and two years less a day respec-
tively, for second, third, and subsequent infractions. 
In addition, a new 50 member RCMP unit devoted 
exclusively to illicit tobacco is being set up (The Ca-
nadian Press 2013).
The impact of these measures will depend on the 
extent to which they will be enforced, particularly 
on-reserve. Until now, the de facto immunity men-
tioned above has severely constrained the effect of 
formal prohibition on the trade. From a security 
standpoint, however, enforcing the new measures 
on-reserve may have negative implications (see 4.6 
below).
4.4 Limiting illicit profit margins 
Various government initiatives have reduced the 
production of raw tobacco leaves in Canada and 
better controlled its commercialization; examples 
include the $300 million federal Tobacco Transition 
Program, Ontario’s Smoke-Free Ontario Strategy, 
the Raw Leaf Tobacco Growers’ Licensing Program, 
and changes to the Tobacco Tax Act meant to bet-
ter regulate raw leaf tobacco. These measures have 
compelled manufacturers to rely on imported to-
bacco and they impose increased costs and use of 
contraband imports to illicit producers. Efforts to 
balance out these costs by using cheaper raw mate-
rial (which may explain the poor quality of tobacco 
in illicit products) in turn affects the product’s mar-
ket price. (RCMP 2011; Frank 2012). Any initiative 
that complicates or directly increases the costs of il-
licit production, such as better control over paper, 
filters, or cigarette machines, or higher taxes on all 
those (Luk et al. 2009, 493-494) would have a simi-
lar effect (Blackwell 2012). 
Bulk manufacturing and storage 
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As well as upstream initiatives, downstream pro-
grams such as effective public health programs have 
led to a continued decline in smoking rates despite 
the lower price of illicit products. Lower demand 
for a lower quality product explains in part the poor 
market price that illicit products command, which 
also constrains profit margins.
All such measures eat away at the gross profit on 
which the black market has developed. The costs 
associated with illicit activities and the low market 
price of illegal tobacco have a direct impact on the 
economic scale of the trade, with a ripple effect on 
collateral crime and the security threats that it feeds.
4.5 Confronting broader 
criminal side effects
Recent research in criminology suggests that selec-
tive enforcement can be extremely effective at reduc-
ing particular crimes (Kleiman 2010; Felbab-Brown 
2013). “Focused deterrence”, as exemplified in pro-
grams such as Boston’s famous Operation Ceasefire 
experiment, have had a large impact on homicides 
while leaving untouched the drug markets of US in-
ner cities. The key to such an effect is the concen-
tration of efforts on particular areas or crimes and 
on ensuring that sanctions will be swift, certain, and 
severe enough to radically change the criminals’ in-
centive structure. 
Perhaps unwittingly, the way in which policing has 
been applied to the illicit tobacco trade looks a lot 
like focused deterrence. Indeed, severe sanctions 
have been reserved for those who trafficked drugs, 
weapons, and humans while leaving essentially un-
touched the “pure” tobacco smugglers. The signifi-
cant amount of money available within the tolerated 
crime space may well have further deterred crimi-
nals from engaging in other types of smuggling that 
would risk a relatively safe but substantial source 
of revenue. This is the most plausible explanation 
for the remarkable absence of “mixed smuggling” in 
CBSA and RCMP seizures and for the very small num-
ber of trials and convictions involving smugglers. 
For Canada, the adoption in 2012 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act (Bill C-10) for terrorism (Sec-
tion 2), drug trafficking (Section 4), and human traf-
ficking (Section 10),30 and the Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act (Bill C-31), which includes 
severe penalties for human smuggling, clearly serve 
such a purpose.31 It is striking that Bill C-10 – by far 
the most important of the two – cites tobacco when 
discussing the health impact of drugs but makes no 
mention at all of smuggling, which clearly contrib-
utes to those health impacts.
The same rationale appears to guide US initiatives 
such as NY Senator Charles Schumer’s Cross Border 
Reservation Drug Trafficking Sentencing Enhance-
ment Act, which, if adopted “would add ten years 
to the sentence of any cross-border drug traffick-
ers that utilize Native American land”, while leav-
ing tobacco smugglers off the hook (Spencer 2011; 
Schumer 2009).
Two directions can be taken from here. One option 
is to reinforce the selective incentives by making it 
explicit that mixed smuggling will be severely pun-
ished while the pressure and sanctions on tobacco 
smuggling would stay at current levels. A particularly 
effective way to do that would be to threaten those 
who engage in mixed smuggling with severe sanc-
tions for both smuggling tobacco and other goods. 
The other option is to focus on illicit tobacco it-
self and try to deter its trade by concentrating re-
sources where it is particularly severe and/or on 
known manufacturers and smugglers. These first 
cases could then be used to deter other people or 
in other areas. The key to such “dynamic concentra-
tion” (Kleiman 2010) is the sustained investment of 
enough resources to ensure swift, certain, and se-
vere enough sanctions to truly eradicate illicit smug-
gling in a core area, and to make sure that any at-
tempt to re-establish it there is punished. Without 
this assurance, smuggling simply shifts around to 
avoid the worst pressure points of law enforcement. 
In a best case scenario, this would be the effect of 
the harsher regime that the Canadian government 
is now introducing. Leaving aside the amount of 
Sanctions must be swift, certain, 
and severe to radically change the 
criminals’ incentive structure.
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resources needed to ensure swiftness and certainty 
of sanction, this option however may also generate 
important side effects given the political conditions 
under which law enforcement must function in and 
immediately around reserves.
4.6 Containing the potential for 
major security challenges 
The manufacture and smuggling of illicit tobacco on 
and through Mohawk reserves combined with the 
general legitimacy they enjoy in the population cre-
ate a dilemma for law enforcement authorities. On 
one hand, smuggling clearly generates revenues that 
feed into collateral crime and could end up financ-
ing terrorist activities. On the other hand, directly 
confronting it is likely to galvanize the affected com-
munities into resistance action.
Given the location of the affected reserves, block-
ades could effectively block important transpor-
tation hubs. The Mercier Bridge, one of the main 
accesses to the island of Montreal, was closed for 
months during the Oka crisis. The bridge to Corn-
wall, albeit much less strategic, was blocked for days 
in protest against the permission given to CBSA of-
ficers to carry weapons.32 The prospect of law en-
forcement agencies losing access to substantial areas 
close to the border, as happened in Oka both dur-
ing and for years after the crisis, is also profoundly 
disquieting. 
Authorities on both sides of the border appear to 
have concluded that the multifaceted threat of il-
licit tobacco was lower than the risk of upsetting 
the on-reserve population through over-zealous en-
forcement. But managing the relationship with the 
Mohawk communities had involved more than just 
turning a blind eye to tobacco smuggling. In fact, this 
represents only a fraction of the ways in which non-
Aboriginal governments have been building bridges 
with the communities. The establishment and financ-
ing of and close collaboration with Akwesasne Mo-
hawk Police is the most prominent of such efforts. 
The implicit and partial recognition these efforts 
embody for the sovereignty claims of the Mohawks 
contributes to a better relationship with the com-
munity. Embedding non-Aboriginals into the local 
police forces and the participation of the Akwesasne 
Mohawk Police in the various regional task forces 
and initiatives contribute to a fluid relationship and 
make the quick deterioration of a local crisis much 
less likely. Dialogues about taxes, even when they 
touch on tobacco, between revenue agencies and lo-
cal partners similarly help build a relationship that 
contributes to effective oversight, if not full control, 
of the area. Preserving those linkages while intensi-
fying enforcement will be challenging. 
4.7 Avoiding US discontent with 
border security 
The US government’s policy towards illicit tobacco 
on Mohawk territories is the mirror image of Cana-
da’s. The priority appears to be to contain its impli-
cations for border security, illegal immigration, and 
drug smuggling. Part of the two countries’ tobacco 
problem today stems from US tolerance of cigarette 
manufacturing on reserves within its own borders. 
Canadian anti-smoking activists have even argued 
that Canada should push to US to act.33 In the face 
of strong measures on crime and human trafficking, 
growing investment in law enforcement capabilities 
in the border area, and a clear willingness to engage 
in joint initiatives and to welcome (as much as po-
litically feasible) US law enforcement into Canadian 
territory, it is difficult to claim that Canadian author-
ities have been lackadaisical.
Directly confronting smuggling is 
likely to produce resistance.
US tolerance of cigarette 
manufacturing on reserves within  
its own borders is part of the 
problem.
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Two challenges still dominate the bilateral agenda. 
The first is the illegal production and exportation 
of ecstasy through Akwesasne, an issue that Frank-
lin County District Attorney Derek Champagne has 
raised forcefully. Once again, however, Canada has 
taken measures to resolve the problem – in particu-
lar by licensing critical manufacturing equipment, 
such as pill presses, the sale of which has long been 
tightly controlled in the US. The fact, noted above, 
that production appears to be moving within the US 
suggests that these measures are producing results. 
One must also bear in mind that ecstasy can hardly 
be considered a major security preoccupation in the 
US.
The second challenge concerns illegal immigrants, 
an issue that has been very prominent on the US se-
curity agenda since the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, the 
Millenium Bomber, who entered from Canada, and 
especially after September 11, even though none of 
the terrorists had in fact come from Canada. Can-
ada has invested massively in border security, and 
the latest legislative changes are the culmination of 
a long series of legal and administrative measures 
taken in part to soothe US sensitivities. 
Conclusion
I Illicit tobacco has security implications for Can-  ada, primarily because it generates millions of  dollars of illegal profit, part of which finds its way 
into the hands of organized crime and feeds collat-
eral crime. Most of the activity lies in the manufac-
turing and smuggling of illicit cigarettes in a few 
Aboriginal reserves located in southern Ontario and 
western Quebec. As such, it is an extremely vulner-
able activity, and could be quickly wiped out by con-
centrated law enforcement efforts. 
However, tobacco production and sale, illicit or not 
from the standpoint of non-Aboriginal governments, 
also enjoys a broad legitimacy among the popula-
tion of the Mohawk territories where they take place 
because of the economic potential they represent. 
Governments must thus balance the risks involved 
in confronting the communities with those that re-
sult from tobacco smuggling. The confrontations 
between governments and Aboriginal organizations 
that mark Canada’s recent history have led Canadian 
and US authorities to avoid disrupting their relations 
with the communities. As a result, and essentially 
for security reasons, law enforcement has hovered 
over the problem, intercepting a small part of the 
product and trying to ensure that the smuggling in-
frastructure is not used to transport other goods, 
in particular weapons, drugs, and humans. Govern-
ment attempts to maintain a level relationship with 
the Mohawks and to limit the use of cross-border 
routes appear to have been quite successful. On the 
basis of the data we could access, the legislative, 
administrative, and operational measures adopted 
have prevented non-tobacco trafficking from reach-
ing significant levels. Moreover, levels of violence, 
both among trafficking organizations and between 
the police and the smugglers, have been low. Pro-
posed legislative changes are very likely to disrupt 
this modus vivendi.
We have identified a few avenues that would make 
current arrangements more efficient. The prospects 
for tax reforms that imply either significant reduc-
tion of taxes or the transfer of taxing responsibility 
and revenues to Aboriginal communities do not ap-
pear very bright. 
We feel, however, that two broad avenues are prom-
ising. The first involves narrowing the profit margins 
of illicit manufacturers and smugglers by improv-
ing control of inputs and continuing downward 
pressure on demand for all tobacco products. This 
would reduce the value of the trade and lessen its 
appeal for large criminal organizations. The second 
involves further strengthening the focused deter-
rence that has limited the use of smuggling routes 
for other purposes. 
Governments must balance the 
risks involved in confronting the 
communities with those that result 
from tobacco smuggling.
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In the end, however, these represent a small tweak 
in a policy constellation that is already effective at 
limiting the security impact of illicit tobacco. This 
is a remarkable outcome considering the complex-
ity of the jurisdictional, administrative, and political 
environments.
Key uncertainties and limitations
There is a wide consensus that most of the illicit to-
bacco in Canada is consumed in southern Ontario 
and Quebec. In its study for the Canadian Tobacco 
Manufacturers, the GfK Group argues that 95 per-
cent of illegal tobacco smokers are in those two 
provinces (2008, slide 9).34 This view is not con-
sistent with the CBSA data on West Coast “marine” 
smuggling. The idea that cigarettes are transported 
between Vancouver and southern Ontario to be sold 
at $2 a pack is hardly believable. The most likely ex-
planation is that a substantial market for illicit to-
bacco exists in BC and Alberta, one that surveys have 
not penetrated, and that is much more open to in-
ternational and Chinese brands. If this is correct, es-
timates of consumption of illicit tobacco need to be 
revised upward and analyses of the security implica-
tions should examine western Canada more closely.
Finally, a full assessment of the security implications 
of illicit tobacco would call for a much more careful 
consideration of the way in which the production 
and sale of legal and illicit tobacco are embedded in 
the economic, social, and political dynamics of the 
Aboriginal communities where it takes place. The 
kind of long-term engagement with those communi-
ties that such research would involve was not possi-
ble within the time and resource frame of this study. 
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Appendix 2 
Policy Framework Governing Tobacco and Narcotics Enforcement in Canada 
and the US
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Speeches from the Throne
The importance of building safer communities by combating various forms of 
smuggling and trafficking was addressed consistently from the 2nd Session of the 
36th Parliament of Canada (October 12, 1999 – October 22, 2000) until the 1st 
session of the 40th parliament (November 18, 2008 – December 4, 2008). The speech 
that opened the 3rd session of the 40th parliament of Canada (March 3, 2010 - March 
26, 2011) stated that judicial tools would be modernized to fight organized crime.
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Appendix 3 
Administrative Framework Governing Tobacco and Narcotics Enforcement 
in Canada and the US
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Endnotes
1  These substantial variations come from the fact that consumption data and wholesale data diverge significantly, 
with the former much lower than the latter. The lower bound here is calculated by multiplying the number of de-
clared smokers by the average consumption of daily smokers (14.4/day) (Health Canada 2011). The higher bound 
is the wholesale data declared by manufacturers (Health Canada 2013).
2  Calculations based on wholesales (31 billion cigarettes) and an average price in Canada (weighted by provincials) 
of $83 for a carton of 250 cigarettes. Data from Non-Smokers’ Rights Association 2012, 7.
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3  The most recent and detailed overview of the evolution of the federal and provincial government revenues from 
tobacco between 1990 and 2012 is “Tax Revenues from Tobacco Sales,” by Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada. 
http://www.smoke-free.ca/factsheets/pdf/totaltax.pdf. Although it includes revenue from the sale of raw leaves, 
loose tobacco, tobacco products, and cigars, the total for 2011 is only slightly higher than here ($7.5 billion for 
2010-2011 and $7.4 billion for 2011-2012), because the organization explicitly does not account for provincial 
sales taxes or for the federal GST. In contrast, this study uses the average final sale price of cigarette cartons, 
which includes those taxes.
4  According to the FAO, the price of raw tobacco in Canada increased from $3356 (US) in 1996 to $3528 in 2004, 
and $4627 in 2010. 
5  “The big money comes from the distribution side. According to police, one ‘kingpin’ admitted to making 
$250,000 a week, while a courier transporting the cigarettes to smoke shacks on reserves pockets up to $6000 a 
week.” (Brennan 2009)
6  Jim Dorn’s documentary, Smoke Traders (2012), similarly examines the legal business of another native manufac-
turer, Rainbow Tobacco, which operates on the Kahnawake reserve in metropolitan Montreal.
7  “The majority of the contraband cigarettes the RCMP seizes across Canada originate from manufacturing plants 
on the U.S. portion of the reserve.… These plants are supplied with refined tobacco from North and South Caro-
linas.…There are 10 factories located there on the New York portion (and only one of them is legal),...) the RCMP 
estimates these plants can produce up to 50 million cartons of cigarettes a year” (Brennan 2009).
8  Websites such as http://www.canadacigarettes.org/camel-cigarettes.html facilitate these transactions.
9  Pilon (1992) provides a full discussion of section 8 of the Charter for search and seizures. See in particular sec-
tion 3 on Border Crossings.
10  “If smokers fail to perceive a difference in quality between lawful and contraband cigarettes, and if they do not 
acknowledge any harm associated with the black market, then there is little reason for them to cease their partici-
pation in the black market” (Gabler and Katz 2010, 38).
11  Some kind of informal arrangements, cartel or “cooperative”, would clearly make sense here. However, transac-
tion costs linked to the socio-political make up of Mohawk communities, as well as enforcement itself, which 
constantly disrupts the equilibria on which stable informal arrangements could be sustained, hamper the creation 
of such arrangements. For a close but successful parallel, consult B. J. McCay (1980).
12  These estimates are much smaller than the numbers that circulate in the media and in law enforcement reports. 
The main reason has to do with the imputed market price used for the latter calculations. For example, the Win-
nipeg Sun reported that, according to court documents, illegal cigarettes “manufactured on reserves in Southern 
Ontario and in areas along the U.S. border” and then smuggled into Manitoba can provide a profit of $1300 to 
$2350 per case of 50 bags (Turner 2012). Leaving aside the fact that cigarettes can be bought legally in North Da-
kota for less than half of their price in Manitoba, without having to travel all the way from Southeastern Ontario, 
generating the kind of profit mentioned, implies that the packs sell for $26 to $47 above the costs of acquisition, 
transportation, and smuggling – which is not realistic. 
13  In Ontario, a 40-hour work week at the minimum wage pays $380.00. This would represent the profit to the 
smuggler of 152 cartons of cigarettes; that is, slightly more than three 50-cartons cases, if one discounts produc-
tion costs ($1), some profit for the manufacturer and what the retailer may keep on a $2 pack (perhaps 0.75 
altogether), leaving about $0.25 per pack, or $2.50 per carton, to the smuggler. This should be seen as a mini-
mum: the RCMP estimates that the trunk of a Chrysler Intrepid, a favourite vehicle of smugglers, can hold up to 
18 cases, or 900 cartons.
14  Using the Quicklaw database.
15  CBSA reports underestimate the relative importance of trade in “products” such as drugs, weapons, and humans 
because the agency only records seizures made at border posts, which means it systematically underestimates 
the quantity of these goods traded between them. While the other sources do not suffer from the same bias, the 
empirical basis of the following discussion is not as strong as we would have liked.
16  See “Aboriginal Border Crossing Rights and the Jay Treaty of 1794” for the Mohawk interpretation of the treaty’s 
implications for cross-border trade. http://www.akwesasne.ca/jaytreaty.html.
17  “Seizures in Valleyfield, Quebec, where the smugglers have concentrated because of the crackdown in and 
around Cornwall, have topped 100,000 cartons and 12,968 kilograms of fine cut tobacco in the period from Jan 1 
to Monday.” (Brennan 2010).
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18  It is not clear that such an understanding is very useful, however. To the extent that the direct negative effects of 
illicit tobacco can be traced to its consumption, which is legal and not deemed an unacceptable hazard, we are 
not sure that it clearly hurt peoples’ “freedom from fear”, which is a more satisfying understanding of human se-
curity introduced by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1941 State of the Union Address, and later enshrined in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
19  This report from the CBC mentions a “Department of Justice Report,” most likely the National Drug Threat As-
sessment, which is the only DOJ publication dealing in some details with drug trafficking. We could not find this 
number anywhere in that report (National Drug Intelligence Center 2011).
20  The UN Organization for Drugs and Crime agrees: “the smuggling of cannabis herb from Canada into the United 
States appears to be decreasing and cannabis production seems to be shifting to the United States side of that 
country’s border with Canada” (2012).
21  According to the August 2009 CBSA’s Quarterly Drug Assessment Report, the US border services at Massena, 
NY, seized 50,000 ecstasy tablets from a Cornwall couple. The same report notes that two other large seizures 
of ecstasy headed towards the US had been made over the same period but both were on the West Coast (CBSA, 
Rapport trimestriel de la contrebande des drogues, September 2009, 14-5).
22  Mohawks of Akwesasne v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) [2009] F.C.J. No. 
1661; 2009 FC 1296; 357 F.T.R. 227; 100 Admin. L.R. (4th) 218; [2010] 2 C.N.L.R. 214; 2009 CarswellNat 4545. 
23  As per the definition of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which was enshrined in Cana-
dian law in 2002 following the implementation of Bill C-24. For a clear discussion of the rationale for this change, 
see R. v. Meloche, [2010] J.Q. no 4774. 
24  While premiums vary, laundering money is costly. 
25  “O” [Ontario] Division Detachments http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/on/detach/index-eng.htm.
26  Canada NewsWire, October 21, 2010 “Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit Seizes Important Quantity 
of Contraband Cigarettes and Cash and Arrests 2 Cornwall Residents.” http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.
carleton.ca/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC00NBGenSrch.
27  Canadian Government News. September 14, 2012. “Ministers Toews and Kenney commend law enforcement for 
arrests in alleged human smuggling/trafficking ring.” http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/hottop-
ics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi= AC00NBGenSrch.
28  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/07/10/cross-border-policing-integration-sovereignty.html.
29  “Rob Cunningham, a senior policy analyst with the Canadian Cancer Society,...offered some solutions, including 
urging Public Safety Minister Vic Toews to persuade U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to shut down illegal facto-
ries on the U.S. side of Akwesasne First Nations reserve, where 90 per cent of the contraband smokes originate.” 
(Brennan 2010)
30  Canada, Library of Parliament, Bill C-10, Legislative Summary. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSum-
maries/41/1/c10-e.pdf.
31  Canadian Government News. September 14, 2012. “Ministers Toews and Kenney commend law enforcement for 
arrests in alleged human smuggling/trafficking ring.” http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/hottop-
ics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi= AC00NBGenSrch.
32  This protest directly caused the relocation of the toll to Cornwall, an outcome that smugglers – who prefer CBSA 
officers to be unarmed – certainly did not intend.
33  “They...advocate putting more pressure on U.S. authorities to crack down on rogue plants in New York state.... As 
for lobbying the U.S., Mr. Toews’s office pointed to a July agreement between the Minister and Janet Napolitano, 
the U.S. Homeland Security Secretary, to develop a “shared vision” of border security. A news release issued at 
the time, however, made no mention of contraband tobacco” (Blackwell 2012).
34  Rob Cunningham, a senior policy analyst with the Canadian Cancer Society, said “90 per cent of the contraband 
smokes originate [from] illegal factories on the U.S. side of Akwesasne First Nations reserve” (Brennan 2010).
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in the Canadian House of Commons from 
2006 to 2008. Prior to entering politics, 
Mr. Dion was a professor at the Université 
de Montréal. This Commentary is based 
on Mr. Dion’s presentation, entitled Seces-
sion and the Virtues of Clarity, which was 
delivered at the 8th Annual Michel Basta-
rache Conference at the Rideau Club on 
February 11, 2011.
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Stéphane Dion (CP) est député fédéral 
pour la circonscription de Saint-Laurent–
Cartierville à Montréal. Il a été élu pour 
la première fois en 1996 et a servi en tant 
que ministre des Affaires intergouverne-
mentales dans le gouvernement Chrétien. 
Il est par la suite devenu chef du Parti 
libéral du Canada et chef de l’Opposition 
à la Chambre des communes de 2006 à 
2008. Avant de faire de la politique, M. 
Dion était professeur à l’Université de 
Montréal. Ce Commentaire reprend les 
principaux éléments de l’allocution de M. 
Dion intitulée « La sécession et les vertus 
de la clarté », prononcée lors de la 8e Con-
férence annuelle Michel Bastarache au 
Rideau Club le 11 février 2011.
It is an honour and a pleasure for me to have been invited to the Michel Bastarache 
Commission… excuse me, Conference.
When they invited me, Dean Bruce Feldthusen and Vice-Dean François Larocque sug-
gested the theme of “clarity in the event of secession”. And indeed, I believe this is 
a theme that needs to be addressed, because the phenomenon of secession poses a 
major challenge for a good many countries and for the international community. One 
question to which we need the answer is this: under what circumstances, and by what 
means, could the delineation of new international borders between populations be a 
just and applicable solution? 
I will argue that one document which will greatly assist the international community 
in answering that question is the opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on August 20, 1998 concerning the Reference on the secession of Quebec. This opin-
ion, a turning point in Canadian history, could have a positive impact at the interna-
tional level. It partakes of the great tradition of our country’s contribution to peace and 
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I commend Brian Crowley and the team at 
MLI for your laudable work as one of the 
leading policy think tanks in our nation’s 
capital. The Institute has distinguished itself 
as a thoughtful, empirically-based and non-
partisan contributor to our national public 
discourse.
PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER
As the author Brian Lee Crowley has set 
out, there is a strong argument that the 21st 
Century could well be the Canadian Century.
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON
In the global think tank world, MLI has 
emerged quite suddenly as the “disruptive” 
innovator, achieving a well-deserved 
profile in mere months that most of the 
established players in the field can only envy. 
In a medium where timely, relevant, and 
provocative commentary defines value, MLI 
has already set the bar for think tanks in 
Canada.
PETER NICHOLSON, FORMER SENIOR POLICY 
ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN
The reports and studies coming out of MLI 
are making a difference and the Institute 
is quickly emerging as a premier Canadian 
think tank.
JOCK FINLAYSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 
OF POLICY, BUSINESS COUNCIL OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
Very much enjoyed your presentation this 
morning. It was first-rate and an excellent 
way of presenting the options which Canada 
faces during this period of “choice”... Best 
regards and keep up the good work.
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